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SCOPE OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Respondent, Daniel P. Ream, hereinafter referred to 
as Ream, has filed a brief on this appeal consisting of four 
points. The thrust of Point IV thereof, as we perceive it, is 
that said respondent claims that the abstract of appellant, 
David L. Fitzen, hereinafter referred to as Fitzen, does not 
set forth enough facts to justify relief on appeal. It is not 
asserted that the facts set forth in the abstract are inaccun:, 
We trust the facts set forth on this appeal are sufficient to 
warrant relief, and thus no attempt in this brief is made to 
treat that point separately. Point I of Ream's brief is deal: 
with in Point I of this Reply Brief. Point III of Ream's brie: 
is dealt with in Point III herein. 
Respondent, Bank of Salt Lake, filed a brief, and tt: 
brief was adopted by respondent, Paul Ream, by virtue of the: 
ter of his attorney to the Supreme Court dated December 13, 
adopting that brief as his own. Point I of the brief of resW 
ent, Bank of Salt Lake, and Point II of Ream's brief are esser: 
.. i 
tially the same and are considered in Point II of this bnet. · 
Point II of the brief of Bank of Salt Lake is well taken Cas: 
respondents, Bank of Salt Lake and Paul Ream) in the sense t~.:. 
a new hearing will be necessary, although it would appear t:-.a: 
new trial would be more appropriate. Of course, the Supre~ 
can in equity direct a judgment in favor of Fitzen and agal~:: 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IT WAS ERROR TO CHARGE FITZEN WITH $22,483 RENT, &~D 
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY FITZEN CREDIT FOR $6,047.47 
DEPOSITED IN THE JOINT VENTURE BANK ACCOUNT AND DIS-
BURSED FOR JOINT VE~TURE PURPOSES. 
In response to Point I of the brief of respondent, 
Daniel P. Ream, hereinafter referred to as Ream, the following 
items should be noted: 
1. A substantial part of Ream's brief and particu-
larly of Point I thereof (not to mention respondent's abstract) 
is devoted to an attempt to show that, because certain of Fitzen's 
exhibits were not admitted for all purposes, that there is no 
evidence to support Fitzen's claimed errors, inasmuch as Fitzen 
has not on this appeal claimed error in regard to those rulings. 
In his abstract Ream sets forth the ruling of the trial court 
admitting into evidence with limitations Exhibits 17 through 23. 
As we have reread those portions of the transcript, we have 
almost regretted not having brought those rulings before the 
court as error--as a matter of principle. It appears to us to 
be rather clear that a very comprehensive and adequate founda-
tion was laid for the admission of those exhibits, and that any 
imperfections in the way those records were kept would go only 
to weight and not admissibility. 
The fact remains that Fitzen made his case without 
those "limited purpose" exhibits. Fi tzen 's case on appeal is 
~stablished by the testimony of the witnesses as abstracted in 
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Pitzen's abstract, which has not been contradicted by Reu a~ 
by the other exhibits which have been admitted into evidence :: 
all purposes. Fi tzen relies particularly upon the exhibits Se', 
forth in his abstract. Pitzen's accountant, Ernest Deters, 
pared Exhibit Dl7 and, as stated above, that effort was adrn:c: 
only to show appellant's accounting. Nevertheless, this same 
accountant was permitted to testify at length and in detail ill:: I 
the records of Pitzen, and Exhibit D36F was admitted later in:', 
trial as a summary of his testimony (T. 413). Furthermore, ti.', 
plaintiff's own Exhibit Pl2 was admitted into evidence, and tt 
contains the records of the Fi tzen-Ream bank account as opposec 
to the Bonneville Wrecking Co. bank records. It is upon that 
Exhibit Pl2 (R. 94) that Pitzen's Point I is based. 
2. Pitzen claims in his brief that it was error 
the trial court to charge defendant with the sum of $22,483 r2: 
of the equipment of the joint venture without regard to whethe:i 
I 
said sum was ever received or actually earned. In response to 
that, Ream in his brief at page 10 says: "Whether any sum was 
ever received by the joint venture from the rental of the equi:! 
ment is not material." That was the contention of Ream at ths, 
trial, and that is what the trial court accepted and adjudged, 
The only evidence as to what was actually received (as OEJ?051 : I 
to what Ream thought should have been received) was that at k: 
$5.259 was not received on joint venture jobs. See ExhlbLt 
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setting forth a summary of the testimony of Ernest Deters. There 
was no evidence contradicting this. Ream's evidence went only to 
what should have been collected. As justification for this, Ream 
is apparently claiming that Pitzen was managing partner, and as 
such was somehow a guarantor of the income of the joint venture. 
This is not supported by the facts or the law. In paragraph 7 
of the agreement between the parties, Pitzen was indeed desig-
nated the managing joint venturer as to the "direction and con-
trol" of the truck. However, the agreement provided also in said 
paragraph 7 thereof: "In all other matters, each of the joint 
venturers shall have an equal interest in the conduct of the 
affairs of the joint venture." It was thus equally the respon-
sibility of both partners to see that records were kept, that 
accountants were retained if that were deemed to be necessary. 
Neither of the partners was an accountant; they were engaged in 
a rather rough-and-ready occupation, to-wit, demolition, and 
neither kept records as perhaps a trained accountant would. 
(Certainly Ream's records, Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, are not models,) 
That, however, is not a justification for denying Pitzen his just 
due. Ream is attempting to say that it doesn't really matter 
what the equities are between the parties, that Pitzen had the 
duty to keep the records, and if there were any imperfections in 
the records, Pitzen should be chargeable with that. That is not 
':he law. Rather, the court should endeavor to ascertain the true 
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equities between the parties based upon the records that are 
available, and that is certainly so where, as here, the recor:' 
are kept in accordance with the abilities and talents of me 
parties. In Dale v. Dale, 57 N. M. 593, 261 P 2d 438 (1953) :.·. 
court held that it was proper to consider the nature of me be:: 
and the ability of the partners, even a managing partner. 
At page 11 of his brief, Ream states: "In the abse: I 
of fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith as to the acts per·' 
formed by Ream, the joint venture had to bear the loss and 
Fitzen was entitled to no credit for those matters." If that 
is the rule of law which binds Fi tzen, it certainly is the ru> 
which binds Ream. It would appear that in the absence of fm: 
culpable negligence or bad faith, Fitzen is not responsible t: 
Ream for collecting on every account any more than Ream is 
responsible to Fitzen to collect on every account. It is a r'' 
business that has a 100% recovery of all of its accounts. 
that is the burden the trial court casts upon Fitzen. 
Ream asserts at page 10 of his brief that: "Under :.~ 
term of the joint venture agreement, he (Fitzen) was chargeab:, 
! 
for the reasonable rental for the equipment use." We have 
examined the instrument carefully and find no such term and 5-
mit that there is none. Pitzen's only obligation is to share! 
equally with Ream all profits and losses. He is not3.guarar.: 
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In support of Pitzen's position on this matter, we 
cite the case of Street vs. Graham, 2 Ut 2d 144, 270 P 2d 456 
(1954), where this court held that it was improper to charge 
the defendant with the "rental" value of the partnership prop-
erty used by him, but rather that the proper remedy was an 
award of one-half the actual net profts from that equipment. 
The recovery was thus limited to actual receipts and a recovery 
for "idle time" of the equipment was disallowed specifically. 
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3. At page 10 of his brief, respondent asserts ~~ 
Fi tzen "commingled the accounts", meaning presumably those of t:;: 
Ritzen-Ream joint venture with those of his own company, Bonne·' 
ville 'ivrecking Co. The testimony was undisputed that, because 
of the damages to the joint venture equipment, Fitzen was 
I 
required to advance from his own company most of the operating! 
funds for the joint venture. Perhaps Ream is suggesting that 
those loans or advances by Fi tzen to the joint venture should I 
I 
not have been paid by him directly, but rather should have firs-[ 
I 
been formally loaned to the joint venture and then checks wn::j 
out of the Fi tzen-Ream account. There would perhaps be no thine 
wrong with that procedure, but it appears that since Fitzen di: 
not have to make those loans or advances to the joint venture:· 
the first place, that it would be unduly harsh to attempt to 
penalize him for making the advances in the most convenient '"I 
to him. Even the Court had no trouble in allowing Fitzen ere:.[ 
for the sum of $26,921.53 expenses incurred on behalf of the ! 
joint venture. Although Fitzen claimed more in the wayofexpe:•J 
than the Court allowed, this appeal does not involve that mat:•· 
What is claimed on this appeal is that it was error to charge 
Fitzen with said $22,483 "rent", and that, even assuming that 
Fi tzen is chargeable with the said sum (which we don • t concede: 
the Court should have allowed Fitzen credit for $6,047,47 act;~j 
. ! 
collected and deposited in the Fitzen-Ream joint venture ba~ 
account and disbursed therefrom as shown in Exhibit Pl2. 
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Fitzen has not claimed that he is entitled to reimburse-
ment for any expenditures made from the Fitzen-Ream account, as 
those expenditures were made from joint venture deposits. Fitzen 
has only claimed reimbursement for Bonneville Wrecking Company 
expenditures on behalf of the joint venture, and although the 
court allowed him $26,921.53 therefor, the court erroneously 
denied his entitlement to credit for the deposits made directly 
into the Fitzen-Ream bank account. 
With respect to Pitzen's claim that he was not given 
credit for $6,047.47 actually received and deposited into the 
joint venture bank account, Ream's only response appears on page 
11 of his brief in which he says: "In addition, Fitzen was unable 
to establish his right to have the Fitzen-Ream account figures 
credited to the joint venture since he was unaware of just what 
moneys were deposited in the account and how they were disbursed. 
He was unable to allocate funds to transactions. He simply did 
not meet his burden of proof with reference to the accounting." 
In our initial brief herein, we have set forth the actual 
amounts of the deposits, and these were admitted in evidence as part 
of Exhibit Pl2, and they are uncontested. It really does not lie 
in the mouth of Ream to claim that Fitzen did not establish the 
deposits. Likewise Exhibit Pl2 (plaintiff's own exhibit) shows 
the disbursements, and at the trial Ream did not take issue with 
ony of them. Only now on this appeal does he attempt to claim 
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that Fitzen did not establish that the disbursements were pr0,, 
At no time at the trial did Ream claim that the disbursements 
were not proper, and there is no evidence that they were not. 
Actually, he does not claim that they are improper even now. 
He only claims that Fi tzen somehow failed to meet his burden 
with respect thereto. On analysis, his only explanation is 
that certain exhibits at the trial were (as stated above) onlj· 
admitted for limited purposes, but the fact remains that the 
Fitzen-Ream account (Exhibit Pl2) was not subject to any such 
limitations. Apparently Ream feels that unless Fitzen has a 
cise memory of all details of all transactions in the Fitzen-
Ream checking account, he is not entitled to any credit there::: 
I 
That is a harsh and unjustified position and is not the law. '!1: 
I 
believe that it is a fair statement that the memories of all m:l 
are more or less imperfect and that is one reason we have bank rec::1 
Exhibit Pl2 was admitted for all purposes and constitutes a 
proper record of those transactions independently of Fitzen's 
memory as to every minute detail. 
In fact counsel for Ream carefully examined Fitzen :: 
the Fitzen-Ream bank account (T217-218) He did not take iss"i 
with the entries found in the account. Rather, it appearsto'.:' 
been his sole purpose to show that only a relatively small nu.~; 
of the joint venture transactions were in fact handled in f1;: 
account. Far from condemning or impeaching the Fi tzen-Ream or 
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account, it was the position of counsel for Ream at the trial 
that all joint venture transactions should have been handled 
through the Fitzen-Ream account. He contended that the trans-
actions which were not run through that account were tainted, 
not that the ones that were run through it were improper. In 
his closing argument, Ream's counsel, Mr. Cayias, stated at 
~age 536 of the transcript: 
"Now, Your Honor, the books and records as presented 
in this matter, Your Honor, are the books and records, in 
substance, of Bonneville Wrecking Company. Theyare not 
the books and records of the joint venture of Fitzen and 
Ream. And so, Your Honor, we don't think that there's 
been the strict proof accorded in this matter that the 
joint venture is entitled to." 
It is clear from this that it is Bonneville Wrecking 
Company records that he was condemning at the trial, not the 
Fitzen-Ream records. Using that approach, counsel was able to 
severely limit the Bonneville Wrecking Company advances for which 
Fitzen was given credit in the accounting. Having gained what he 
em with that approach, counsel now for the first time attacks 
me joint venture records also. What he is really saying thereby 
is that the distinction he made at the trial between the joint 
venture records and the Bonneville \-'lrecking Company records is 
not valid after all, and if that is so, a new trial is the proper 
remedy. Ream has not impeached the joint venture bank account 
:ecords, and Fitzen should at least be given credit for the 
$6,047.47 deposited into that account. 
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POINT II. THE PURPORTED $6,000 LIEN IN FAVOR OF PAUL REAH 
WAS NULL AND VOID AS TO ALL PARTIES IN THIS ACTION, 
The thrust of Fi tzen' s Amended Counterclaim is to ha·. 
the court declare the purported lien to Paul Ream in the 5~ 0 : 
$6,000 declared nulland void. In paragraph 2 of the prayer 
thereof, Fi tzen asks (R. 69) : "That the court adjudge and dec:' 
I 
that the aforesaid purported lien of $6,000 is null, void and ::! 
no force of (sic) effect whatever, and that 1 . j coun terc a1.m defen:·j 
I 
An act;c:.l ants have no rights in said truck by virtue thereof." 
I 
to obtain such relief is and traditionally has been equitable, j 
and that, we believe, notwithstanding the claim that three par:.l 
act together fraudulently to put it of record. 
In addition to the authority cited in our initial br:i 
we refer the court to 13 Am Jur 2d, Cancellation of Instrumer.ts 
Sections 7 and 16. In said Section 7, it is stated; 
"Equitable jurisdiction to cancel is exercised 
basis of a protective or preventative justice when a ~~ 
is afforded relief from agreements, securities, deeds, or 
other instruments on the principle that these instruments 
may be vexatiously or injuriously used against him when 
evidence to impeach them may be lost, or that they may 
throw a cloud of suspicion over his title or interest." 
In the case of Norback v. Board of Directors of Ch~/ 
Extension Soc., 84 U 506, 39 P 2d 339 (1934), the Supreme Couc:! 
of Utah said: 
.. If the issues are legal or the major issue 
legal, either party is entitled upon proper demand to a 
jury trial; but, if the issues are equitable or <:he . 
major issues to be resolved by an application of equlc,·· 
the legal issues being merely subsidiary, the actlon 
should be regarded as equitable and the rules of equit: 
apply." 
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In accordance with the foregoing authorities, this 
action is equitable as to all parties, and the Supreme Court can 
and, we believe, should, overrule the trial court and find that 
the purported $6,000 lien was indeed null and void as to Pitzen. 
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POINT III. EVEN IF THE $6,000 LIEN TO PAUL REAM IS NOT VOIDEc 
AS TO THE OTHER RESPONDENTS, IT REQUIRES A $6,000 
REDUCTION IN DAN REAM'S EQUITY IN THE JOINT VENTURE. 
In Point III of Ream's brief, he asserts that Fitzer:': 
position on the $6,000 lien to Paul Ream was not raised in the 
i 
lower court. This is truly an incredible assertion. If there I 
is one point that is spread upon the record of this case in th: 
lower court from one end to the other, it is that Fi tzen has 
denied the validity of and has objected to the purported $6,00: 
lien in favor of Paul Ream. Ream's counsel even responded to 
said claim in his argument to the court at the conclusion of 
the trial. On page 556 of the transcript, counsel for Re~ 
stated, "The $6,000 was strictly a loan to Dan Ream, and he 
wouldn't loan that money to Dan Ream unless he had some protec-
tion. And it was all understood at the time that they were toj 
get the loan, Paul Ream had to have the protection as far as 1 
these $6,000 he had loaned his son. It was just that simple."! 
And again at page 558: "I can't see, Your Honor, in the regu; 
I 
I 
annals of legal thinking on damages how you could claim a $3,0c' 
loss because Dan borrowed $6,000 from his father to put in th: 
joint venture. There's no proof, no basis, for that." 
Fitzen seeks to have the liens voided as against at: 
the parties to this lawsuit, but even if the court should ~ot I 
that it is not void as to the Bank of Salt Lake and Paul Rea"J I 
it certainly constitutes a "$3,000 loss" to Pitzen. (Requiri:: 
partner to contribute $6,000 to the joint venture appea.cs t= 
equivalent of ordering that partner to pay directl:/ '::o t~e =: 
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partner one-half of said amount, or in other words $3,000.) 
It should be noted from the foregoing closing argu-
ments of Daniel P. Ream's counsel that there is no contention 
mat the $6,000 is a loan to the joint venture. It was strictly 
a loan to Ream. Likewise, it should be noted that in the brief 
filed herein by the Bank of Salt Lake, it is admitted at page 2: 
"Because Dan Ream did not have the necessary funds, Paul Ream 
agreed to loan Dan Ream the $6,000 to purchase the truck, but 
on the condition that Paul Ream be granted a lien on the White 
Truck to secure such $6,000.00 loan." 
Paul Ream has not filed a separate brief herein, but 
in a letter to the court dated December 13, 1977, accepted as 
his own the brief of the Bank of Salt Lake. Thus, even Paul Ream 
concedes that the money was a loan to his son and not to the joint 
venture. 
(Ex. P4) 
In paragraph 11 of the joint venture agreement,/it is 
provided that: "Each of the parties hereto agrees to assume and 
pay his own separate debts and to indemnify the other against the 
same and all expenses on account thereof." Fitzen contends, and 
'-'e believe that the record bears out, that he is not subject to 
the burden of the said $6,000 lien which he did not sign. Even 
if Fitzen is held to have ratified that transaction, it is still 
not a joint venture debt as between the joint venturers. As 
bet~veen the joint venturers, it is a charge against the interest 
of Dan Ream in the joint venture. 
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It is the contention of Fitzen that Ream's initial 
contribution to the joint venture of $6,000 should be charged 
back against him by virtue of the lien to his father, which is 
his personal debt, not that of the joint venture. The over-
whelming weight of the evidence was that the truck was lost cc 
the joint venture because of the existence of the $6,000 lien 
to Paul Ream. Having agreed to indemnify Fi tzen against any 
loss by virtue of Ream's personal debts, the loss of the truci 
should be charged to Ream's account. In short, we believe tha: 
Ream's contribution of $6,000 was conditioned upon Ream's see1:l, 
to it that Fitzen suffered no loss by reason thereof. This he 
did not do. By analogy, if a set of tires had been charged tc 
the joint venture for the personal use of Ream (or Fitzen for ; 
that matter) , would anyone contend that the account of the jo: I 
venturer receiving the tires should be charged in said amount: 
Here too, the debt in favor of Paul Ream of $6,000, being for 
the personal use of Ream, must in fairness be charged to hill. 
In his Point III, Ream claims that no actual loss t: 
Fi tzen has been shown. This is simply not the case. On Augus·i 
I 
1975, Fitzen sent a letter to Ream giving notice of terrninati:i 
of the joint venture in accordance with paragraph 13 thereof.] 
(See Exhibit D26F).) At that time the truck was in for repa:>l 
On October 17, 1975, the defendant, Bank of Salt Lake (·.vhich 
became Commercial Security Bank) sent to the joint ventureys 
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letter telling them to pay off the indebtedness (which at that 
time had a net payoff of $21,558.56 (see also T 375) as shown in 
said letter) within ten days or the bank would turn the item 
over to Paul Ream or would sell it to the highest bidder. That 
letter was admitted as Exhibit DlOBSL. The bank later granted 
an extension to November 10, 1975, and stated to Fitzen's attor-
ney, Robert C. Cummings, that the bank would notify said counsel 
of any proposed disposition of the truck and give Fitzen infor-
mation as to the time and place of such disposition so that 
Fitzen could bid on the item. The facts of that extension are 
not contested, and the substance of that conversation is set 
forth in Exhibit D28F, which is a letter dated October 28, 1975, 
from Fitzen's attorney to Bank of Salt Lake. (See also T 358 and 
364-365). 
The existence of the $6,000 lien to Paul Ream was 
ascertained on November 5, 1975 (T 368). 
The Bank of Salt Lake disposed of the truck on or about 
)lovernber 25, 1975, (this date was stipulated to by counsel (T 382)) 
and Bank of Salt Lake gave notice to counsel for Fi tzen on or about 
that date. This notice was in the form of a phone call from the 
bank's attorney, Mr. Snow, to Fitzen's attorney advising that the 
truck had been assigned to one of Paul Ream's companies. No 
o~~ortunity was given to Fitzen to make a bid on the truck and 
t~is was the first time notice of any disposition was given 
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(T 382 and 383). 
Prior to that date three offers had been made on the i 
truck. An offer for $22,000 was made by Mr. Seegmiller (T 38] 1 
and in addition an offer was made by Mr. Maxfield of Maxfield ! 
Trucking for $22,500. The third offer was made by Pitzen hirnse.l 
I 
where he offered to assume the indebtedness on the truck at Ba:l 
of Salt Lake and also to assume the debt on the tractor and tol 
pay into the joint venture $6,000. Later on he made another I 
offer, the tenor of which was the same except that he would I 
actually refinance the truck in addition to paying $6,000 intc I 
the joint venture. We set forth here actual portions of the 
transcript on this matter as follows (T 389-390): 
"Q Mr. Cummings, I believe you have already testified 
that there were the three offers, if I am not mistaken, 
including the Seegmiller matter? 
A That's correct. 
Q And what amounts were they in each instance and 
from which source? 
A Well, the sources of the one was Seegmiller for 
$22,000. During this period of time, I suppose about 
October 28th, I don't recall the exact date, we ran an 
ad in the Salt Lake Tribune to try and get the highest 
amount of money we could. In response to that ad, I . ! 
received a call from a Mr. Maxfield of Maxfield Truck1ng.[ 
I told him where he could go to look at the truck, He . 
did that, called me back, and offered $22,500 for it, 
which I conveyed in these letters, and also indicated 
to Mr. Snow. It appears in several of the letters I 
told him about it, and I also told Mr. Snow about it 
on the 23rd. 
The third was David Pitzen's offer, wherein he 
offered to assume the indebtedness on the truck at 
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Bank of Salt Lake, and also to assume the debt on the 
tractor, and to pay into the Joint Venture $6,000. 
That was his intitial offer. Later on, he offered 
actually to refinance the truck in addition to paying 
$6,000 if that was the problem. -
Both of those offers carne in sequence. I don't 
recall the exact dates, but they were conditioned 
upon a clean title, getting rid of that $6,000 lien. 
It wouldn't have much meaning in the face of that. 
Q And were any of those offers accepted? 
A They were not. " 
The substance of these offers was conveyed to the Bank 
and to Dan Ream as seen from the above. See also (T 371-373 and 
T 376) and Exhibit D30F and Exhibits D31F. 
It thus appears to be clear that, had Ream taken care 
of the obligation to his father, the truck could have been dis-
posed of at a profit to the joint venture of at least $6,000 over 
and above the indetbedness to the Bank of Salt Lake. Ream's con-
tention that damages have not been proven in this regard is not 
born out by the record. The exhibits relating to the foregoing 
are set out at the end of this brief for convenience and are 
D30F 
Exhibits D26F, D28F,/D31F and DlOBSL (return receipts attached 
to some of these exhibits are not set forth in this brief.) 
It should be noted further that in the Uniform Cornrner-
cial Code, even if the joint venture itself be held in default to 
the Bank of Salt Lake, the Bank of Salt Lake has an obligation 
~der the Code to notify the joint venture as to any proposed dis-
?Osition, and this for two reasons: (l) because the said statute 
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requires it (See Section 70A-9-504 (3)), and (2) because the 06 .. 
! 
agreed to do so (See Exhibit D28F). Furthermore, pursuant to 
Section 70A-9-506 (since the collateral was not disposed of 
until November 25, 1975), the joint venture (in the language :'I 
I 
the statute) had the right: 11 At any time be fore the secured :'. 
has disposed of collateral or entered into a 
position .. (to) redeem the collateral by 
of all obligations secured by the collateral 
contract for its :i 
I 
tendering fulfiLl 
. . . (together .;: . 
expenses) 11 • (The words in parenthesis are a paraphrase of the 
statute.) It is therefore submitted that Fi tzen complied witl, 
the requirements of the statute in making a good faith offer:: 
Ream and to the bank, but even that is not really the issue. 
The issue is whether or not a bona fide offer for the purchase 
of the truck had been made so as to enable the court to make; I 
reasonable determination as to the value of the truck which'" 
.. I 
lost to the joint venture. That certainly has been accompllsr'l 
It is clear that the loss to the joint venture is the $6,000 :! 
by Fi tzen over and above the indebtedness on the truck, That 
$6,000 would have gone into the joint venture and was the bes:l 
offer made on the truck. It should be noted that the joint·:', 
ture agreement provides in paragraph 14 that upon dissolutioo 
1 
the joint venture " ... the highest bidder is hereby given the::/ 
to purchase the aforesaid truck and ot~er equipment, if an::·,-
the joint venture . Pitzen's bid certainly complied 
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that requirement and establishes the loss to the joint venture 
at $6,000. 
The truck was lost to the joint venture by reason of 
the $6,000 lien. One of Paul Ream's companies obtained the truck 
from the Bank of Salt Lake (T 72, 78) and Dan Ream testified at 
the trial (January of 1977) that he was then using the truck 
(T 73-79). The truck cost approximately $38,000 new in 1974 
($800 down plus $30,249.72 financed). Although it had been 
•.vrecked, it had been fully repaired. The balance owing when it 
was repossessed in November of 1975 was $21,558.56. In November 
of 1975 Pitzen offered $6,000 for it over and above the debt to 
Bank of Salt Lake. Dan Ream has used it since then and was still 
using it at the time of the trial. It would seem that the mini-
mum demands of justice require that the joint venture account 
of Dan Ream be charged with the loss of $6,000 by reason of 
the loss of the truck to the joint venture. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has not been the intention of the appellant, Fit 2, 
to impose upon this court the burden of wading through a vol::::_ 
no us accounting. Although, as stated, appellant feels that :'.-
lower court erred in many areas, he has "licked his wounds" or. 
most of those. For purposes of this appeal, only the most 
obvious errors have been cited in the hope that those errors 
could be demonstrated to the Supreme Court with sufficient 
clarity, that at least in those areas the action of the lower 
court might be corrected and the appellant might receive some, 
if not all, of the compensation to which he is entitled. We 
certainly feel that appellant should receive credit for the 
actual moneys deposited by him in the Fi tzen-Ream account in 
the sum of $6,047.47, and further that he is entitled to haVe' 
the court declare that the purported $6,000 lien of Paul ~~ 
(which was never signed by Mr. Pitzen) is void. In any 
event Pitzen is entitled to the benefit of an appropriate 
reduction of $6,000 in Ream's joint venture account by reasor. 
of the loss of $6,000 to the joint venture when the trial viai 
lost by reason of the $6,000 lien to Paul Ream, which was D'" 
Ream's sole responsibility. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, '1.::\.DS Eel & CDI'L'!I:lGS 
Gordon .".. ~-lads en 
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Commercial Securitv Bank 
tl 
:}fcRru.Y OFFICE 
PosT OFFICE Box 7580 
5101 SouTH STATE STREET 
lft"IUU.Y, "C"HH 84107 
lktober 17, 1975 
:11". Daniel P. Ream and David Fitzen 
•701 Pasque '!lay 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
:lear Mr. Ream: 
lie currently have possession of your 1975 White Dumpt Truck Serial No. 
KOP5RHDD12310, reflecting a remaining balance owing of $22,713.79 and a 
net payoff of $21,558.56. 
•<e will hold this unit for a period of ten (10) days from the date of this 
letter to enable you to obtain funds and redeem the unit. If we do not 
hear from you as indicated, the unit will be either tt:trned over to Paul 
~eam, or sold to the highest bidder. Should a deficiency result from 
' the sale either to Mr. Ream (Paul), or other purchaser, you will be held 
responsible for this deficiency. 
'.ie encourage you to exhaust every effort and obtain funds to redeem the 
Clllit as indicated. 
lSO: 1 t 
::: Javid ?itzen 
::: File 
Sincerely yours, 
v. /:::~~ _/;:~-
a. Scott 9lson 
Collection Department 
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C~tober 2 81 1975 
~. Larr] C~ristensen 
Ban:< of Sal~ :::.a:-:e 
3039 Soilt.'1 State St~eet 
Sal.t ~a~..:e Ci.:;:~l, ::.;.tah 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT _ 
· j_ e t--' 
~::is letter . .,ill co:1:i~ c~:i- teleplione cou.versa~ion of· 
Octo~er 23, 1375. I~ t~at ~slep~one ~on7e=3ation I advise~ 
you. t::=.t Dan ~8a_""J. an.::. ~avid Fi::zen :.,r~r.: ..=..tta:r!pti:lg <:a resol":le 
t~= ~if=icul~i.es 3..5 to ·.,;!-lo r,..rould be ~l:e· .5:..J.c:::asso= to t..'~i.=; 
eq'Jipmen-:. an G. r.'/:-._o COUld tban 1 in turr: 1 .::or:;e i:1 an=. r.:ake 
arrangecents ~!=~ you. You indicated to ~e that yoil wo~li 
Jold o:f ·.1::~~1 _:ovc::t~e= l)t .. l. be=or~ ~...:...--:d~:--:.3.:-<.ing an:.: steps 
t: ~is?ose of ~~e aq~i~~ent in order ~o ~llow ~3 ~o =esol·/8 
:~i5 ji.::i-=ul~f :;,:t.~"·een ourselves. 
Yo'J li.~:e,.:Tise .::.q=~ed -:.::at :..: , fo= a:-1~ r~a.sc:1, ·.rc f,,:e=e· :lOt a~.:...-= 
to ··TC!:!< out -:.::.:..5 :::at-c2~ J.::d a C.is-oo3:..-=..:.c:1 bv :.::e. ::;an~ ~.-:er~ 
neces3a.=:t, t!:3.= -.-re ~1c:.:!d be aC.7ised of =:-:.= ~i::-:e· 3-n:::. ?:l:l::e so 
t~a.: -:e -=auld :::c::-.a a:1C:. ::,ic. or.. it as :!=. 2itzen · . .;oul.:l ~a::'i:1i.~.=:y 
wa::.t t..o r.1ake a :si:;, :or t....~a eqai~:J.ent i:1 t..~a:. even·t. 
1Ter1 truly yours I 
ROBERT C. CUlo1MI:lGS 
~sh 
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'-AN OFl='ICES 
MADSEN. CUMMINGS & HARRIS 
::::;;:c:::OC"' A '.1.J.=5C:', 
~,;a~~T" ::: C- Y'-1 ",CS 
~'-3SEL- :: ~.a.~=- 5 
:l SANFCIRO ~·ORSE..-..SE'< 
clover..ber l.Cl, 1915 
Mr. William J. Cayias 
Attorney at L.J.'" 
1558 Sout~ 11th East 
Salt Lake City, Ctah 
Dear Bill: 
P o ac.x 17S.3 
SALT LAKE ClTY UTAH 9..1110 
R~· ?itzen vs. Dan Ream 
Although we have waited now ~or a good many days for your 
stiPulation which was to be designed to facilitate biddlng 
for- the White tr'J.ck:, etc., it has not arri•Jed. .:-,s I 
indicated to you some time ago the Bank of Salt Lake 
indicated that t~ey would withhold further action through 
the lOth of ~overnber 1975 to Jive us an opportunity to 
work out our ?roblerns as between Ream and Fitzen. 
As you know, se•1e:::-al ·.veeks ago we offered on behalf o~ Fitzen 
that he would assume the balance with the B.J.nk of Salt Lake 
on the ~·lhite truck, that he ·,.;ould lik·:;wise assume the balance 
on the First Security Bank and would ?ay Ln addition to the 
joint venture $6000. To date that is, I believe, the best 
offer that has been made and Lnasmuch as time runs out tod~ 
I take it that it is the only of~er. If vou will be aood 
enough to furnish sufficient releases to Bank o~ Salt-Lake 
so that they can convey good title to us, we will see that 
they are ?romptly paid the balance owing. As I lndicated ~. 
you before ·.-1e take the posl tion that the so-called second a~c 
third liens are in fact not that at all. The second lien, 1: 
it is valid at all, appears to be nothing more than a guar~~ 
that Paul Ream ~ill not sustain a~y loss ~f he is called to . 
?3. y anyt~i:1g as a gua..:- an t.o r. L'ndc:: t~e above arooo sal, :;.e' :: 
CQ'i..:!:'S-2, r.~·i2.l r!o~ b·~ C3.l:'=d :.JpOn :.a ?-2':" ar-.~·t.hi:--.S I ~nd ":~e:-e::~: 
~e ~a~e the ;as~~tcn tha~ t~e secc~d l~en LS vo:d. T~2 
"::;..:.=C. 1:..=!1 ·.v3.S :1~n.:::::.r' si~l.·~G -I 'Jr3.~/::.·.:: ~"'.:i :.3 s::-::..::.:~· =.. 7::e:CS~";-I 
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~r. Wllliarn J. C!yias 
:lo•;e:cber 2.0, 19-:'S 
Page T"".vo 
matter between the two ~earns, and as far as I can determine 
amounts to nothing more than a right in Paul to take over 
the position of Qan, but he will still, as I see it, be 
subject to the JOint venture agreement. We, therefore, take 
the oosition that the releases of those two liens should be 
im:ne::iia tely delivered to the Bank of Salt Lake. 
/'-
POBE?.':' C. c:;:.rHclGS 
:1Sh 
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DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
-_;; !-. F 
:J'lcl:Jsad. :.s ~ ..... a:.:., ... ·.v 2:.:.:.. Ca:""ias :cc·r::-:r) ···•t·.o .,. ... atto~.r;:.~ for .:an :!ea~ a:r.d 
S"t:;:cose ::.."'::- ?;i.u: .:-e.:;.~ a~ we.2.l. ~~is: t:-.:~k se2..!' e:~l2!1it.vr:r. Za:~r~-1 ?i::e~ 
s~o.::ds re'":·::.- :o ~a:.· -~:oi..:. of.: :_., l~1ll in 2d.c:iti ~:-. :o ?d::~ng :-:-6cco i:-:o :r.e 
.:o:.~t ·.·er:":'..:r-e. It:.:~,::- ;o~~::.c. t~.a~. ~?.:-:-::c..n-=. ~:~sa:_..:. -cr.i~s ·.nil s::t:::..::-
?i t:.r:-!: :o an ll::s~.:·...t:-1:---:--=d ~i tle. 3o :ar ;:s - r-.. 2 .. :~ t:e~n ~;;.:..~ t,: ie·.e~:..::e, 
~!1e :::-ru:sac·,i.o~ ::.:. "":·J: =a:~. :~vr- a~J' 2:-::: :-:- Jr-·· ~:.en, th~ sar..e we~e :-:~ve~ 
!i·..:.:....~c:-i::::ed by ?it::e!"'l, a:-:C. a:..::~.«:'...:.:;:: tr.e i::i ..... :.~:.. r~s;:'=·n::.bilit:; is or. !::..· ..... 1 
?.ear.: ~o rt.Er;:ove 't~-= :.~=!:.s, ·,we .'"7.J3t :..r.o'-. to :a~X o.: Salt -aka •.o see t:-.. a't t:.:.s 
:s :.c::.e, as Sar:k c:· 3a:."C. -~~:e ::. 7.-:::e~::-:: :.:: • .. ~~e (j~e -...-r.~.o ac:u~:.:y ::uf.:"'sz-£d tr.ese 
1l..."'lal..:. -::--.ori:ed :.=.e::s :o ::e _C'2.a..::ed :)' :h~-? tr'l.~~-. .ie -..rilJ ~ot be a.tlt- to aL.ow tt.e 
ba:"'l< :o at:sr::-~ a.r..y .A.:..-;c ,~:-- .:.~cre·~:..ss-...::-e -: :.+,.::; ls~ lier: ·...tt-.ere it :-.as p:.2ced 
·nrcr:~!'el ::-: . ..: ;;-~~ J::- ... :..:.s:.s 
sett:.e.~en~ c:..~ :.:::..:: -c:.::er. 
or~ t~.€ 
re~!"~sen~a ti:::-:.s ~c :-.e :-.:-.rl ~ he ·,.; o· lc'. C:r. ~n, ~· ~. C.'l:.--:.;:.s :; :.:.:.1 r.cs :;.at ::::-c::..:.ced 
t.~e stip..i~.:t:.:-:1. ·~·~ s:~nc rL.a.:y "":..o ..::c ::--,e ri~~t tt'..i!1-;; tu t · .. ie a:-p r.~: i.::cl:!.::ed 
-:o ":e i.~1=oeed :.:.~o:-1. - we· l·J. a~:=;!"t:.:i:::r. .. -?:-:"·i!i: :ro::1 ::C"..z a:: soor: a:; ;o.:::::::;_e 
:"C!ga~r..g r~sc:..'"" t.:..::: ::-:.~ t~·j:s :-a~ ~cr. 
I 
/C 
?.o ':ert "• 
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